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IMPLEMENTING DATA PROTECTION BY DESIGN IN
THE ED TECH CONTEXT: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF
TECHNOLOGY PROVIDERS?
Liane Colonna*
This article explores the specific roles and responsibilities of technology
providers when it comes to implementing Data Protection by Design
(“DPbD”) and Data Protection by Default (“DPbDf”). As an example, it
looks at the Education Technology (“Ed Tech”) sector and the complexities of
the supply chains that exist therein to highlight that, in addition to the Higher
Education (“HE”) institutions that procure products and services for
advancing teaching and learning, Ed Tech vendors may also have
responsibility and liability for the processing of student’s personal data.
Ultimately, this paper asks whether there are any legal gaps, ambiguities, or
normative conflicts to the extent that technology providers can have
responsibility in contemporary data processing activities yet escape potential
liability where it concerns issues of General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”) compliance.
This paper argues that there is befuddlement concerning the determination of
which parties are responsible for meeting DPbD and DPbDf obligations, as
well as with regards to the extent of this responsibility. In some cases, an Ed
Tech provider is a controller or processor in practice together with a HE
institution, yet, in others it, may not have any legal responsibility to support
the development of privacy and data-protection preserving systems,
notwithstanding the fact it might be much more knowledgeable than a HE
institution that has procured the Ed Tech product or service about the state-ofthe-art of the technology. Even in cases where it is clear that an Ed Tech
provider does have responsibility as a controller or processor, it is unclear
how it should share DPbD obligations and coordinate actions with HE
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institutions, especially when the Ed Tech supplier may only be involved in a
limited way or at a minor phase in the processing of student data.
There is an urgent need to recognize the complex, interdependent, and nonlinear context of contemporary data processing where there exists many
different controllers, processors, and other actors, processing personal data
in different geographical locations and at different points in time for both
central and peripheral purposes. Likewise, the complexity of the supply of
software must also be emphasized, particularly in contexts such as the supply
of educational technology where technology providers can play a key role in
the preservation of privacy and data protection rights but may only have a
tangential link to the universities that ultimately use their products and
services. There is also a need for a more dynamic approach of considering
responsibility regarding DPbD. Instead of thinking about responsibilities in
terms of “purpose” and “means” the law should shift towards a focus on
powers and capacities. The law should also clarify whether technology
providers must notify controllers about changes to the state-of-the-art and, if
so, to what extent.
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I.

Introduction

In the European Union, data controllers bear primary responsibility for
ensuring that processing activities are compliant with data protection law,
including the requirements for Data Protection by Design (DPbD) and Data
Protection by Default (DPbDf) set forth in Article 25 of the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR).1 However, in many instances, controllers are
not necessarily the ones who are in a position to build privacy into systems at
the very outset of their development and to ensure that this requirement is
fulfilled through the product’s lifecycle. This may be because a controller
purchases a product downstream such as some pre-designed off-the-shelf
solution or it might rely extensively on a data processor, limiting the capacity
for a controller to exert influence in the design of a technological system. It
might also be because the controller simply lacks the technical knowledge to,
for example, stay up to date with the state-of-the-art.
Recital 78 of the GDPR recognizes the dilemma and states that
technology providers2 have a core role in securing DPbD and DPbDf.3 The
European Data Protection Board (EDPB) echoes this sentiment and explains
that technology providers are “key enablers” for DPbD since they are more
knowledgeable about the potential risks that the use of a system or service
may involve, and are more likely to be up to date on technological
developments.4 Nevertheless, the notion of “technology provider” is rather
broad and may not fall under the remit of data protection law in every
situation, especially where a technology provider does not receive, process,

1

Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 25, 2016 O.J. (L 119); Commission Regulation
2016/679, art. 82, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 3 (noting that a controller may be exempted from
liability, in whole or in part, “if it proves that it is not in any way responsible for the event
giving rise to the damage”).
2
See Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) recital 78 (“Technology
providers” is understood broadly to include entities that supply technology products or
services. For example, they might supply the necessary technology services, software tools,
devices, or infrastructure in a particular digitalized environment). See Center for Information
Policy Leadership, infra note 5.
3
Id. (stating “When developing, designing, selecting and using applications, services and
products that are based on the processing of personal data or process personal data to fulfil
their task, producers of the products, services and applications should be encouraged to take
into account the right to data protection when developing and designing such products,
services and applications and, with due regard to the state of the art, to make sure that
controllers and processors are able to fulfil their data protection obligations”).
4
Eur. Data Prot. Bd., Guidelines 4/2019 on Article 25 Data Protection and Design V 2.0,
EUROPA ¶ 94 (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_201904_dataprotection_b
y_design_and_by_default_v2.0_en.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines 4/2019].
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store or access any personal data but merely provides a product or service.5 In
these situations, it may be difficult for data controllers to exert influence over
technology providers to demand a high level of data protection through, for
example, contractual negotiations.
II.

Data Protection by Design

In many ways, DPbD represents a new generation of legal strategies in
the Digital Age where traditional forms of law have become outmoded.
Taking a proactive approach to law, DPbD has a conscious orientation to the
future insofar as it seeks to avoid privacy and data protection problems before
they can occur.6 Fundamentally, it involves the transformation of legal rules,
namely those that appertain to privacy and data protection, into both
organizations and systems.7 Multiple parties are involved in its
implementation such as engineers, managers, lawyers, policymakers, and
executives within an organization and each group is expected to share
responsibility for achieving privacy goals.8
With the adoption of the GDPR, Data Protection by Design (DPbD)
became a legally binding obligation and placed data controllers at risk of
substantial fines for noncompliance.9 The actual language of Article 25 of the
GDPR has been explained as “tautological” and “theoretical.”10 As such,
recent guidance has emerged from data protection authorities11 and
academia,12 helping to make the provision more concrete and understandable.
5

Center for Information Policy Leadership [CIPL], Comments by the Centre for Information
Policy Leadership on the European Data Protection Board’s “Guidelines 4/2019 on Article
25 Data Protection by Design and By Default” Adopted on 13 November 2019 1, 6 (Jan.16,
2020),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/webform/public_consultation_reply/cipl_response_to_e
dpb_privacy_by_design_guidelines.pdf.
6
See generally Peter Seipel, Nordic School of Proactive Law Conference June 2005 Closing
Comments, 49 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 359, 360 (2006).
7
Dag Wiese Schartum, Making Privacy by Design Operative, 24 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH.
151, 152–53 (2016).
8
Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385, 402
(2013).
9
Lina Jasmontaite et al., Data Protection by Design and by Default: Framing Guiding
Principles into Legal Obligations in the GDPR, 4 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 168, 172 (2018).
10
See Pwel Kamocki & Andreas Witt, Privacy by Design and Language Resources, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH CONFERENCE ON LANGUAGE RESOURCES AND EVALUATION 3423
(Nicoletta Calzolari et al. eds., 2020), http://www.lrecconf.org/proceedings/lrec2020/index.html.
11
See Guidelines 4/2019, supra note 4, at ¶ 5.
12
See e.g., Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy’s Law of Design, 9 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1239, 1286
(2019); Jasmontaite et al., supra note 9, at 172, 174; Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection by
Design and by Default: Deciphering the EU’s Legislative Requirements, 1 OSLO L. REV. 105,
117 (2017).
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Article 25 clearly states that organizations must “implement
appropriate technical and organizational measures... which are designed to
implement data protection principles..., in an effective manner and to integrate
the necessary safeguards into [data] processing.”13 The Article also clarifies
that in so doing, organizations must take several factors into account: thestate-of the-art, the cost of implementation and the nature, scope, context, and
purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity
for rights and freedoms of natural persons posed by the processing.14 Recital
78 provides a list of potential measures that may assist a data controller with
its compliance burden.15 These measures include “minimizing the processing
of personal data, pseudonymizing personal data as soon as possible,
transparency with regard to the functions and processing of personal data,
enabling the data subject to monitor the data processing, and enabling the
controller to create and improve security features.”16
Furthermore, Article 25 mandates the use of Privacy by Default
(PbDf).17 PbDf “means that in the default setting the user is already protected
against privacy risks” and “this affects the choice of the designer which parts
are wired-in and which are configurable.”18 Jasmontaite explains, “[w]hile the
concepts are interrelated, (DPbD) refers to the existence of embedded
safeguards and mechanisms throughout the lifecycle of the application, service
or product that protect the right to data protection, whereas (DPbDD) refers to
the activation and application of such safeguards as default setting.”19
Likewise, ENISA states, “(DPbD) refers to the design and existence of
embedded safeguards and mechanisms that protect the right to data protection
throughout the lifecycle of the application, service or product, as discussed
above,” whereas “(DPbDD) refers to the implementation of such safeguards as
a default setting.”20 This means in practice “that boxes should be pre-checked
for the most privacy friendly option, or the option that allows the collection of
the least amount of personal data, and that it should be made clear to the user
what personal data is being collected, and what it may be used for.”21
13

Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) recital 78.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Waldman, supra note 12, at 1256.
17
Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) recital 78.
18
George Danezis et al., Privacy and Data Protection by Design—From Privacy
to Engineering, ENISA 11 (Dec. 2014), https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/privacyand-data-protection-by-design/@@download/fullReport.
19
Jasmontaite et al., supra note 9, at 168.
20
Id.
21
Deceived by Design, FORBRUKERRÅDET 9 (June 27, 2018), https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/2018-06-27-deceived-by-design-final.pdf (citing European Data
Protection Supervisor, Preliminary Opinion on Privacy by Design, EUROPA 7 (May 2018),
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-0531_preliminary_opinion_on_privacy_by_design_en_0.pdf).
14
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Sanctions for failing to implement DPbD and DPbDf may come hand
in hand with a breach of one of the data protection principles, implying a kind
of data protection double jeopardy. Waldman makes the point that the core of
Article 25 is the requirement to take technical and organizational steps
designed to implement data protection principles but since these principles are
covered in other parts of the GDPR, Article 25’s version of DPbD effectively
turns into “a catch-all provision with no specific requirements of its own.”22
Likewise, Jasmontaite et al. state: “DPbD and DPbDf constitute a meta
requirement system embedding the (GDPR) principles in every personal data
processing operation.”23 Stalla-Bourdillo et al. succinctly explain: “DPbD is
the backbone of the GDPR, as complying with Article 25 should lead to
complying with the data protection principles, as detailed by Article 5, and to
enable all data subject rights, as listed in Articles 12–22.”24
III.

The Complexity of the Ed Tech Supply Chain

Higher education (“HE”) institutions are increasingly adopting Ed
Tech products.25 Educational technology can be defined as “a complex,
integrated process, involving people, procedures, ideas, devices and
organization, for analyzing problems and devising, implementing, evaluating
and managing solutions to those problems, involved in all aspects of human
learning.”26 Ed Tech has evolved rapidly in recent years, especially because of
the COVID-19 pandemic.27 For better or worse,28 institutions have replaced
clunky desktop computers with mobile technologies, virtual and augmented
realities, simulations and immersive environments, social networking, cloud
computing, Ed Tech robots, Internet of Things-based devices, machine
22

Waldman, supra note 12, at 1256.
Jasmontaite et al., supra note 9, at 189.
24
See Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon et al., Data Protection by Process How to Operationalize
Data Protection by Design for Machine Learning, FUTURE PRIV. F. (2019), https://fpf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/WhitePaper_DataProtectionByProcess.pdf.
25
See generally OFF. OF EDUC. TECH., REIMAGINING THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN HIGHER
EDUCATION (2017), https://tech.ed.gov/files/2017/01/Higher-Ed-NETP.pdf.
26
ASS’N FOR EDUC. COMMC’NS & TECH., THE DEFINITION OF EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY 19
(1977); see also ALAN JANUSZEWSKI, EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
CONCEPT 78 (2001); RONGHUAI HUANG ET AL., Introduction to Educational Technology, in
EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY: A PRIMER FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (2019) (“Educational
technology refers to the use of tools, technologies, processes, procedures, resources, and
strategies to improve learning experiences in a variety of settings, such as formal learning,
informal learning, non-formal learning, lifelong learning, learning on demand, workplace
learning, and just-in-time learning.”).
27
Remote Learning During COVID-19: Lessons from Today, Principles for Tomorrow, THE
WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/edutech/brief/how-countries-are-usingedtech-to-support-remote-learning-during-the-covid-19-pandemic (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
28
See e.g., Justin Reich, Ed Tech’s Failure During the Pandemic, and What Comes After, 102
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 20 (2021).
23
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learning, blockchain tools, and more.29 This section briefly explains the
complexity of the Ed Tech supply chain, highlighting that many different
actors are involved, including hardware and software providers, internet
providers, subcontractors, etc., as well as, of course, the HE institutions that
ultimately employ the tools.
At the outset, it is important to acknowledge that universities often
have scarce resources in terms of budgets and staff time to select Ed Tech
products and services. Universities also face organizational, political, and
bureaucratic hurdles during the procurement process.30 Thus, even though it
would be strategic for universities to engage key stakeholders, such as
teachers, administrators, and students, in dialogue with each other and vendors
in order to ensure the suitability of Ed Tech products, research suggests this
rarely happens.31 Generally, Chief Technology Officers (CTOs) assume
primary roles in selecting and acquiring ed-tech products.32
There is a vast array of Ed Tech available on the market and under
development. Broadly, the technology helps teachers effectively produce and
manage resources and release notices and manage students; helps students
obtain resources and participate in learning activities; helps teachers and
students interact in real time; and helps teachers, students, and universities
understand students’ learning performance and make timely interventions.33
Polonetsky and Tene categorize Ed Tech innovation into four categories: 1)
administrative technologies, which help to more effectively manage
schools; 2) delivery systems, which help to augment traditional learning tools,
and data management solutions; 3) measurement tools, which deploy big data
analytics to measure the performance of students, teachers, and schools; and 4)
optimization programs, which enable personalized and adaptive learning.34 If
learning management systems and video conferencing represent older digital
education technologies, then adaptative tutors and virtual reality represent
emerging techniques.35

29

See generally HUANG ET AL., supra note 26.
Jennifer R. Morrison et al., From the Market to the Classroom: How Ed-Tech Products Are
Procured by School Districts Interacting with Vendors, 67 EDUC. TECH. RSCH. DEV. 389, 393
(2019).
31
Id. at 394.
32
Id. at 395.
33
Smart Learning Institute of Beijing Normal University, Personal Data and Privacy
Protection in Online Learning: Guidance for Students, Teachers and Parents, UNESCO
(2020), https://iite.unesco.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Personal-Data-and-PrivacyProtection-in-Online-Learning-Guidance-for-Students-Teachers-and-Parents-V1.0.pdf.
34
Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Who Is Reading Whom Now: Privacy in Education from
Books to Moocs, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 927, 934 (2015).
35
Reich, supra note 28, at 21.
30
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The fact that many of the new and emerging Ed Tech technologies are
driven by big data and AI has created concerns over the power shift from
universities to the suppliers of Ed Tech. Critics of Ed Tech, including
educational and privacy advocacy groups, are concerned that student data is
being improperly shared with private vendors, risking student privacy rights
and data protection.36 For example, one concern is that student data
concerning sensitive information like learning disabilities might be shared
with a third-party vendor who then uses the information for monetization or
manipulation.37 Ostensibly, placing responsibility on Ed Tech companies for
DPbD and DPbDf could alleviate some of these concerns and help to
rebalance power relationships.
From a legal perspective, however, it is unclear whether Ed Tech
companies are obligated to meet the requirements of DPbD and DPbDf as set
forth in Article 25 of the GDPR. Two key questions relevant to understanding
whether an Ed Tech company is bound by the law are: how and to what extent
do Ed Tech companies’ products and services process personal data? Which
actors are involved in the supply chain that play a role in the design of the Ed
Tech product or service? Because the answer to these questions will vary
depending on the product or service, a hypothetical example below introduces
the complexity of data processing operations. The example involves learning
analytics, broadly understood as “the measurement, collection, analysis, and
reporting of data about learners and their contexts, for the purposes of
understanding and optimizing learning and the environments in which it
occurs.”38
The hypothetical example herein involves a HE institution that uses a
predictive learning analytics (PLA) app called Course Cues to identify learners
who may not complete a course.39 The objective of the app is to provide useful
information to teachers to help them identify at-risk students so that they can
intervene and provide academic support for the student. More broadly, the app
helps to increase retention of students.40 The app works by utilizing AI to
identify students who may fail to submit their next teacher marked assessment

36

See Joe Jerome, Privacy is key: Holding EdTech accountable, HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG
(Apr. 15, 2021), https://us.boell.org/en/2021/03/31/privacy-key-holding-edtech-accountable.
37
Yoni Har Carmel, Regulating “Big Data Education” in Europe: Lessons Learned from the
US, INTERNET POL’Y REV. (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/regulating-big-data-education-europe-lessonslearned-us.
38
George Siemens, Learning Analytics: The Emergence of a Discipline, 57 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 1380, 1382 (2013).
39
Cf. Christothea Herodotou et al., A Large-Scale Implementation of Predictive Learning
Analytics in Higher Education: The Teachers’ Role and Perspective, 67 EDUC. TECH. RSCH.
DEV. 1273 (2019).
40
Cf. id. at 1276, 1278.
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(TMA).41 Using predictions about whether a student will submit their next
TMA, the system is also able to provide information about whether a student
will complete a course.42 The app mines static data like demographics, and
behavioral data like students’ interactions within the virtual learning
environment hosting a course like Moodle and subsequently transforms the
data into a generated risk level with supporting information for each student.43
In this specific hypothetical example, the software vendor behind Course Cues
has chosen not to release the product as a deployed system, but rather as an
application service, where it sells the usage of its product rather than the
product itself.44
As noted above, the scarcity of resources has led the HE institution to
delegate responsibility for procuring applications, like Course Cues, to its
CTO who enters into a contract with the third-party Ed Tech service provider
in order to gain access to the application.45 In return, Course Cues gains access
to valuable student data.46 The terms of the service agreement are likely
opaque and not readily or publicly accessible, although in Scandinavian
countries (e.g. Sweden), this may not be the case where openness and
transparency are vital parts of public administration.47 Another possible
consideration is that Course Cues scrapes students’ profiles for information to
build secondary tools and services.
The supply chain of a service like Course Cues is highly complex,
increasingly distributed, and diverse.48 The fact that providers can build
commercial software offerings like Course Cues, using a variety of opensource components also creates complexity in this context to the extent that
the inclusion of open-source components into a product or service may limit
41

Cf. id. at 1278.
Cf. id.
43
Kimberly E. Arnold & Matthew D. Pistilli, Course Signals at Purdue: Using Learning
Analytics to Increase Student Success, LAK ‘12: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON LEARNING ANALYTICS AND KNOWLEDGE 267–70 (2012); Herodotou et al.,
supra note 39, at 1278.
44
See Slinger Jansen et al., Providing Transparency in the Business of Software: A Modeling
Technique for Software Supply Networks, in 243 THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR
INFORMATION PROCESSING BOOK SERIES: ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATION OF
COLLABORATIVE NETWORKS 677, 679 (Luis M. Camarinha-Matos et al. eds., 2007).
45
See Jeff Harris & Rick Skinner, Recasting the Role of the Higher Ed CIO/CTO, HARRIS
SEARCH ASSOC., https://harrisandassociates.com/pub/publications/publications/recasting-therole-of-the-higher-ed-ciocto/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
46
See Herodotou et al., supra note 39, at 1275.
47
See REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] (SWED.), TRYCKFRIHETSFÖRORDNINGEN [TF]
[CONSTITUTION] (SWED.), YTTRANDEFRIHETSGRUNDLAGEN [YGL] [CONSTITUTION] (SWED.),
SUCCESSIONSORDNINGEN [SO] [CONSTITUTION] (SWED.).
48
Petri Helo & Yuqiuge Hao, Artificial Intelligence in Operations Management and Supply
Chain Management: An Exploratory Case Study, PROD. PLAN. & CONTROL 1, 1 (2021),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09537287.2021.1882690.
42
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the possibilities for DPbD or DPbDf.49 Besides the end user, students and
teachers, and the Ed Tech provider, many other actors are involved in the
supply chain of a service like Course Cues. Put differently, the development of
AI-based Ed Tech software involves a large number of technical resources as
well as stakeholders like front-ed developers, back-end developers, data-base
managers, cloud vendors, etc.50 Brinkkemper and Finkelstein explain:
“software products and services are no longer monolithical systems developed
in-house, but consist of complex hardware and software system federations
produced and sold by different organizations.”51 As a result of the increased
complexity, participants acting within the supply chain face greater difficulty
in managing reasonability and liability as well as risk, more broadly.52 In
short, due to emergence of computer networks and modern software
development practices, software supply chains have witnessed significant
changes in recent years.53 Long gone are the days of stand-alone software.
These are the days of large and complex system-of-systems.54
IV.

Responsibility for DPbD and DPbDf in the Ed Tech Context
a.

Responsibility as a Controller or Joint Controller?

The GDPR places the responsibility of ensuring DPbD and DPbDf,
and all other requirements of the regulation, on a data controller.55 The
provisions in Chapter III of the GDPR—concerning the rights of the data
subject—are not only squarely directed at the controller, but also make it the
controller’s responsibility to compensate any person who has suffered damage
as a result of an infringement or by processing data in violation of the
regulation.56 Besides defining the scope of accountability and the degree of
eventual liability, the identification of a data controller enables
communications from data subjects and data protection authorities to data
49
Kapil Singi et al., Trusted Software Supply Chain, IEEE/ACM INT’L CONF. ON AUTOMATED
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 1212, 1212 (2019), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8952169;
Bert-Jaap Koops, Open-Source Intelligence and Privacy by Design, 29 COMPUT. L. SEC. REV.
676 (2013).
50
ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP, AI in Education: Designing fair and robust AI-based
assessments systems, Big Innovation Centre (2020).
51
Jansen et al., supra note 44, at 677.
52
Id.
53
Singi et al., supra note 49, at 1212.
54
Audrey J. Dorofee et al., A Systemic Approach for Assessing Software Supply-Chain Risk,
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. 2 (Feb. 2003),
https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/WhitePaper/2013_019_001_297385.pdf.
55
Tomas Sander, Why You Should Implement Privacy by Design Before GDPR’s First
Birthday, INFOSECURITY MAG. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.infosecuritymagazine.com/opinions/implement-privacy-design/.
56
Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 12–23, 2016 O.J. (L 119) (further noting that
processors can also be liable but only if they did not comply with the instructions given to it
by the controller).
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controllers.57 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held that
data controllers must ensure, within the framework of their responsibilities,
powers and capabilities, that their data processing meets all of the guarantees
laid down by law to ensure the effective and complete protection of data
subjects, in particular, of their right to privacy.58 Blume puts it simply: “data
protection stands and falls with the controller.”59
A data controller is an entity that “determines the purposes and means
of the processing of personal data.”60 In other words, the data controller is
responsible for determining respectively the why and the how of certain
processing activities.61 According to the predecessor of the EDPB, the Article
29 Working Party,62 “[b]eing a controller is primarily the consequence of the
factual circumstance that an entity has chosen to process personal data for its
own purposes.”63

57

Briseida Sofia Jiménez-Gómez, Risks of Blockchain for Data Protection: A
European Approach, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 281, 311 (2020) (“The importance of
identifying a data controller is two-fold. First, it defines the degree of responsibility for
participants, consequently, the scope of accountability and the degree of eventual liability.
Second, it enables communications from data subjects and data protection authorities to data
controllers.”); see also Eur. Data Prot. Bd., Guidelines 07/2020 on the Concepts of Controller
and Processor in the GDPR Version 2.0, EUROPA 3 (July 7, 2021),
https://edpb.europa.eu/system/files/202107/eppb_guidelines_202007_controllerprocessor_final_en.pdf (stating “[th]e concepts of
controller, joint controller and processor play a crucial role in the application of the General
Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR), since they determine who shall be responsible
for compliance with different data protection rules, and how data subjects can exercise their
rights in practice.”) [hereinafter Guidelines 07/2020].
58
In Google Spain, the CJEU found that the notion of controller is one that should be
interpreted broadly to ensure “the effective and complete protection of data subjects.” In that
case, the Court found that Google Spain was a data controller which processes personal data
in a manner that “can be distinguished from and is additional” to that of the original publisher
because its “data processing [...] affects the data subject’s rights additionally.” In reaching this
conclusion, the Court found that it is not necessary that the controller actually has access to
the data that is being processed to qualify as a controller. See C-131/12 Google Spain SL and
Google v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) 2014 QB 1022: (2014) 3 WLR
659 (ECJ, 13 May 2014) ¶¶ 34, 35, 38, 83 (Google Spain).
59
Peter Blume, An Alternative Model for Data Protection Law: Changing the Roles of
Controller and Processor, 5 INT’L DATA PRIV. 292, 292 (2015).
60
Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 7 (defining a controller as “the
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with
others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the
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Mahieu et al. and Ivanova suggest that at least three criteria exist to
establish a controller as independent.64 First, the controller must carry out
distinct data processing operations.65 Second, each of the respective data
processing operations should affect separately the data subject(s).66 Third,
there should not exist a legal relationship between the controllers as this may
make them joint controllers or processors.67
In addition to controllers, the GDPR recognizes that there are instances
where “joint controllers” exist “[w]here two or more controllers jointly
determine the purposes and means of processing.”68 Joint controllers must
determine “in a transparent manner” their respective responsibilities as well as
provide information to the data subject in a proactive manner.69 A joint
controllership can result from “a common decision taken by two or more
entities” or it can result from “converging decisions by two or more entities
regarding the purposes and essential means.”70 An important criterion to
identify converging decisions is “whether the processing would not be
possible without both parties’ participation in the sense that the processing by
each party is inseparable, i.e. inextricably linked.”71 The EDPB concludes:
“The joint participation needs to include the determination of purposes on the
one hand and the determination of means on the other hand.”72 It is further key
to remember that for a joint controllership to exist, it is not necessary that
separate parties determine the purposes and means equally.73
In Fashion ID, the CJEU concluded that the Fashion ID company was
a joint controller because it had embedded on its website the Facebook ‘Like’
social plugin and thereby exerted “a decisive influence” over the collection
and transmission of the personal data of visitors (e.g. the user’s IP address and
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browser string) to the third party service provider, Facebook.74 The CJEU
further concluded that the purposes of processing were jointly determined to
the extent that the processing operations were performed “in the economic
interests” of both Fashion ID and Facebook.75 Essentially, the Court came to
the conclusion that using third party services that collect and transmit personal
data gives rise to a joint controllership, so long as both controllers have
economic interests in the processing.76 Here, it is worth emphasizing that
while the Court found Fashion ID is responsible for the collection and
transmission of the personal data collected on its webpage, it was not
responsible for the subsequent processing that Facebook carried out.77
Mahieu et al. and Lindroos-Hovinheimo describe the approach taken
by the Court in Fashion ID to determining a joint controllership as “phaseoriented”78 or a “step-by-step” approach.79 This is because the CJEU limited
its determination of the existence of the joint controllership to only the set of
operations in which Fashion ID and Facebook were both involved (e.g.
collection and transmission of data).80 In other words, it examined the data
processing chain and decoupled the processing operations from the processing
system as a whole in an effort to attribute Fashion ID and Facebook as joint
controllers.81
In the Ed Tech context, a controllership or joint-controllership may
exist even if an individual or entity does not have any access to the data in
74
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question.82 In this case, if an Ed Tech provider has influence over the “means”
of processing for their own economic benefit then they may be classified as a
controller.83 Ivanova points to the “know-how” and “information and
technology capabilities” of many technology providers and suggests that they
have a “decisive influence” over the “means” of processing.84 Likewise Chen
et al. note that the architectural designers of systems or the collaborating or
independent developers of certain components may fall within the scope of a
controllership as they are the ones defining in technical terms how personal
data are collected and for what potential purposes.85
When it comes to the imposition of DPbD and DPbDf responsibility
onto technology providers through the finding of a joint controllership, the
phase-oriented approach applied by the CJEU is problematic to the extent that
it fails to recognize the “complex, interdependent and non-linear context of
contemporary data processing.”86 Ivanova explains, “distinguishing the phases
and types of data processing operations may turn out to be particularly
difficult in certain circumstances or outright inadequate.”87 In particular, this
may be quite irrelevant when all operations actually pursue a common
objective or are part of an integrated service or product involving many
different actors.88 Ivanova contends that, because the “phase-oriented
approach focuses only on the set of operations or phases of processing, it
82
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inherently entrenches the Court’s analysis in examining only the joint ‘means’
of processing, but disregarding the common overarching objective(s) which
may ultimately connect the various data processing phases along the full data
value chain.”89 To put it differently, by focusing on the stage of processing
where a controller is directly involved, and not the preceding or subsequent
stages is to lose the forest from the trees; this approach fails to understand that
“the effects on and the risks for the rights and freedoms of individuals of such
complex systems, are–as a whole–much bigger than the mere sum of the risks
connected to the individual processing phases.”90 Mahieu et al. conclude that
the result of the phase-oriented approach to data protection taken in Fashion
ID is that the data controllers are unable to meaningfully discharge
responsibilities, particularly since there are insufficient methodological
approaches to divide up complex data processing operations into different
phases.91
Instead of the phase-oriented approach in allocating responsibility,
Ivanova suggests using the “’responsibilities, powers and capacities’” criterion
established in Google Spain.92 She explains that this approach is preferable
since all requirements for DPbD “would be thus placed directly on the service
provider within whose ‘powers and capacities’ solely remain the provision of
a GDPR compliant service.”93 She further explains that this would include
“designing the appropriate arrangement for the allocation of data protection
responsibilities which users of the service must only accept and implement
accordingly.”94
The “responsibilities, powers and capacities” approach is sensible
since it recognizes that there are often multiple entities involved in modern
data processing activities as well as focuses on the entity that has the most
influence over the processing. Another benefit is that it avoids the mucky
territory of divorcing data processing functions in a contextual and structural
void which may lead to liability for an entity that has little or no control over
the offensive data processing. In other words, instead of potentially arbitrarily
delimiting stages of data processing, it takes a more holistic, balanced, and
common-sense approach that may include considerations like the complete life
cycle of personal data processing as well as who is best positioned to
safeguard the rights of the data subject. In some situations, a technology
provider will merely facilitate the necessary infrastructures for data processing
whereas in others, it will be in a far better position than the data controller to
control the way that personal data are handled and to design the system in the
89
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most privacy preserving manner.95 In the latter case, it makes more sense to
hold them accountable under the GDPR.
Regardless of whether the “responsibilities, powers and capacities”
approach is adopted over the “phase oriented” approach, there is still the
significant issue of how to allocate responsibility and liability between joint
controllers, particularly if a technology provider only has a tangential
connection to the personal data processing activities and is involved only
during a short phase of processing. The CJEU has been emphatic that joint
data controllers do not necessarily have equal responsibility in respect of the
processing of personal data.96 For example, in Wirtschaftsakademie, the Court
explicitly stated that joint data controllers may have “different degrees” of
involvement and responsibility which requires specific assessments, paying
attention to all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case.97 That said,
the Court failed to offer any guidance as to how to apportion the shares of
responsibility, particularly in situations where joint controllers do not clearly
arrange their responsibility.98
It is possible that the use of Article 26 of the GDPR may have a role to
play in this context which permits the use of contracts to allocate spheres of
responsibility.99 The existence of a contract allocating responsibility will likely
be relevant to any analysis of the circumstances of a particular case, even if it
must be acknowledged that under existing legal doctrine, in many instances a
(joint) controllership can result from technical or organizational configurations
rather than an explicit legal arrangement between concerned parties.100 Also,
practical challenges to drafting these agreements will be high given the
difficulty of deciphering who is responsible for what in the context of modern
data processing activities. Standardization to demonstrate compliance with
best available practices may also prove to be relevant in assessing each
controller’s level of responsibility.
b.

Responsibility as a Processor

95

DAVID MCAULEY ET AL., COMMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD’S
GUIDELINES 4/2019 ON ARTICLE 25 DATA PROTECTION BY DESIGN AND BY DEFAULT, ¶¶ 5, 13
(2020).
96
Case C-210/16, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v.
Facebook Ir. Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2018:388, ¶ 43 (June 5, 2018) (“operators may be involved at
different stages of that processing of personal data and to different degrees, so that the level of
responsibility of each of them must be assessed with regard to all the relevant circumstances
of the particular case”); see also Case C-25/17, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Jehovan todistajatuskonnollinen yhdyskunta, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, ¶¶ 65–66, 75 (July 10, 2018).
97
Id.
98
Mahieu et al., supra note 64, at 85.
99
Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 26, 2016 O.J. (L 119).
100
Chen et al., supra note 85, at 282.

97

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet – Vol. 13

A data processor is an entity that “processes personal data on behalf of
the controller.”101 According to the EDPB, in order to qualify as a processor,
the entity must be separate from the controller and it must process personal
data on the controller’s behalf.102 That said, the EDPB has stated that
“practical aspects of implementation . . . can be left to the processor.”103
While controllers are primarily responsible for compliance with all of
the provisions of the GDPR, processors are required to process the data
according to the controller’s instructions and comply with the set of
obligations provided in Article 28. For example, processors must only process
personal data on instructions from a controller, unless otherwise required by
law.104 Additionally, a processor must enter into a binding contract with the
controller.105 Processors must also provide “sufficient guarantees to implement
appropriate technical and organizational measures” in order to protect personal
data against loss or unlawful processing.106 While the GDPR lists the elements
that the processing agreement must include, it should also include “more
specific, concrete information as to how the requirements will be met.107 Data
processors must also only engage with other processors after they have
obtained “prior specific or general written authorisation (sic) of the [data]
controller.”108 Finally, it is important to note that the GDPR sets forth a
“cumulative” liability regime, such that, “(i)n situations involving more than
one controller or processor, every controller or processor involved in the
processing may in principle be held liable for the entire damage, provided the
damage results from its failure to comply with an obligation to which it is
subject (article 82[4]).”109
If an Ed Tech provider is classified as a processor because it processes
personal data on behalf of a controller, then it will bear some responsibility to
implement DPbD. While Article 25 does not mention data processors
specifically, Article 28 does specify that a controller must only use processors
that provide: “sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and
101
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organisational measures in such a manner that the processing will meet the
requirements of this Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the
data subject.”110 While it is unclear whether a data processor must actively
assist a data controller to meet its DPbD obligations, at a minimum it appears
the processor must guarantee that it meets the requirements of the GDPR.111 In
other words, controllers must select processors which provide sufficient
guarantees to meet GDPR requirements, ostensibly including DPbD.
c.

Responsibility as a Technology Provider

There is no definition of a technology provider in the GDPR. That said,
the proposed EU AI Regulation defines a “provider” as “a natural or legal
person, public authority, agency or other body that develops an AI system or
that has an AI system developed with a view to placing it on the market or
putting it into service under its own name or trademark, whether for payment
or free of charge.”112 It further defines “small-scale provider,” “importer,”
“distributor,” and “operator.” Recital 60 explicitly acknowledges “the
complexity of the artificial intelligence value chain” and encourages “relevant
third parties” like “the ones involved in the sale and the supply of software,
software tools and components, pre-trained models and data, or providers of
network services” to cooperate to meet legal obligations.113 The fact that EU
AI Regulation acknowledges a broad range of operators in the chain of supply
of AI and seeks to regulate the various actors is an implicit recognition that the
GDPR, directed only at data subjects, controllers, and processors, is
insufficient on its own to effectively regulate AI.
A central question that arises is whether technology providers have
control over the processing. In many instances, it is the controller who is
poised to define the purposes of processing, leaving technology providers
largely unaware of both the “nature, scope, context and purposes of
processing” as well as any risks to the data subject that may arise from the
processing activities. A good example of this concerns developers, understood
as “the parties that develop software, architect services and operate the cloud
infrastructure.”114 Developers write the code that controls core software, but
they are unlikely to qualify as a controller “because they only make available
the software to the user.”115 That is, they do not control the software use, nor
110
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the data that it stores.116 Nevertheless, they are in a key position to enable
DPbD and DPbDf since they have the capacity to build a technological system
that can completely stop certain actions as well as privilege certain
stakeholders and values at the expense of others.117 As discussed above, this
could give rise to an argument that they have control over the “means” of
processing and therefore constitute controllers, subject to meeting all of the
requirements of the GDPR.
While Recital 78 extends the DPbD concept to technology providers, it
does not require them to comply.118 That said, it does place a responsibility,
albeit non-binding, on a data controller to work with technology providers that
have taken privacy and data protection into account during system
development.119 Note that the effect of Recital 78 is to place pressure on
technology developers to take DPbD into account to increase their
attractiveness in the market. Here, the EDPB stresses the competitive
advantage technology providers and processors can gain by ensuring they not
only implement DPbD themselves but can advise controllers on how best to do
so.120
Despite the lack of a binding legal obligation, the EDPB argues that
technology providers should play an active role in ensuring that the “state of
the art” criterion is met.121 This is because technology providers may be in a
better position to identify the potential risks that the use of a product or service
may entail. In other words, it suggests that technology providers assist data
controllers stay up to date on technological progress. Particularly if a
controller purchases or procures a service or product downstream. EDPB
contends that “(c)ontrollers should include this requirement as a contractual
clause.”122
The concept of “state of the art” exists within various EU acquis, such
as environmental protection and product safety.123 In the GDPR, reference to
116
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the “state of the art” is not only in Article 32, for security measures, but also in
Article 25. The EDPB guidelines explain that the concept of “state of the art”
is “a dynamic concept that cannot be statically defined at a fixed point in time”
and “imposes an obligation on controllers, when determining the appropriate
technical and organizational measures, to take account of the current progress
in technology that is available in the market.”124 In a footnote, the EDPB
guidelines identify “state of the art” as “the technology level of a service or
technology or product that exists in the market and is most effective in
achieving the objectives identified.”125 This implies a certain level of maturity,
an ability to ensure effective implementation and an objective character.126
Next, technology providers may have an obligation to notify data
controllers of changes to the “state of the art” that may affect the effectiveness
of the measures in place to mitigate against privacy and data protection
infringements. While this obligation may be non-binding under the GDPR if a
technology provider is not a controller or processor, it is possible that to
incorporate the obligation into a contract.127 It is important to note that while
the GDPR clearly regulates the contractual relationship of the controller and
the processor in Article 28, it makes no mention of the obligation of
technology providers to notify controllers of any changes to the “state of the
art.”128
Once again, the complexity of the supply of software must be
emphasized. If one considers the hypothetical app Course Cues, described
above, it becomes apparent that the app involves linked software, hardware,
and service organizations all cooperating to satisfy the market demand for the
app. Unlike a physical good, the app is also malleable after its release and
delivery, giving raise to the need for significant maintenance.129 However,
there is often a lack of information, communication, and feedback between
different actors in the software supply chain about how software should be
maintained.130
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While there theoretically should be a transparent view of all changes
throughout the software development lifecycle, effective coordination between
relevant actors can be challenging, especially where geographically distributed
teams work on software development.131 From a practical perspective, this
would certainly complicate placing a rigid legal demand on Ed-Tech providers
to notify controllers about changes to the “start of the art.” Here, it can be
argued, pointing to Article 28(3)(f),132 that any obligation to support the
controller in understanding the “state of the art” must be strictly limited to the
information that is available to the technology provider.133 It can also be
argued that there should be a legally defined relationship between the actors
insofar as it may be impossible to regulate informal and ad hoc relationships
that exist within a software supply chain, especially when one takes into
consideration the use of open-source code.
d.

Critical Perspectives

In many ways, it makes sense to hold an Ed Tech provider responsible
for DPbD since they are in a position to develop a system that supports data
protection principles, values, and rules. As Tsormpatzoudi et al. explain: data
controllers only operate at the very end of the supply chain which may be too
late for the obligations of DPbD and for DPbD to be effective.134 However, it
is virtually impossible to predict all potential privacy and data protection
harms ex ante. Technologies are situated in society and interact with humans
who can use them in unimaginable ways. Indeed, the multistability of
technologies, a concept proposed by Ihde that refers to the unpredictable uses
of technology different from the originally intended ones, is well explored.135
When it comes to Ed Tech, the end users – teachers and students – are
generally not be the same person as an Ed Tech’s client (the university
represented by a CTO). This complicates DPbD since Ed Tech companies are
far removed from teachers and students who might find new and unexpected
uses for the technology that that neither the school nor the technology provider
imagined.
In recognition of the iterative and dynamic nature of the design process
(which does not necessarily have a clear beginning and endpoint),136 the
GDPR requires controllers to implement DPbD measures and safeguards both
131
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at the time of determining the means of processing and at the time of
processing itself.137 The controller must also regularly review the effectiveness
of the chosen measures and safeguards.138 In other words, in order to meet the
DPbD requirements, measures and safeguards should be adopted at the
conception phase (the time of determination of purposes and means), and
considered throughout the whole processing stage (up until erasure or
anonymization of the data).139
The fact that technological consequences are hard to foresee from the
design perspective suggests that is may be appropriate for lawmakers to limit
the extent of liability held by Ed Tech providers. In many cases, it will be
impossible to understand and foresee privacy and data protection threats
during the Research and Development stage or even after a Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA) is conducted.140 Even after a technology, infrastructure,
system, service, or device has been deployed or put to use, the uncertainty or
unawareness of all the privacy threats and implications of the technology in
question may remain.141
While technology providers should try to make systems adaptable to
different kinds of risks that arise in various processing environments, the
reality is that this may not always be possible from a design perspective, even
after a PIA. Even the Spanish data protection authority (AEPD) acknowledges
that the use of off-the-shelf third-party components may limit the possibility of
configurability.142 Asking technology to configure the products in a privacyaware way without full knowledge of the context of use, or any knowledge of
particular set of specifications, is almost like asking them to see in the dark.
Besides, the technical limitations may be unduly costly, particularly for
smaller companies.
V.

Conclusion

Blume contends that data protection is founded on a fiction “that the
data controller is in control and is able to meet the obligations set out in the
law.”143 He suggests that this model rejects the kind of data processing that
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occurs in modern life due to the complexity of current ICT.144 Criticizing the
unrealistic obligations on controllers set forth in the GDPR, he states: “It is
undesirable and clashing with general legal culture and tradition to have rules
that communicate obligations that cannot be met by those who are obliged to
do so.”145
Blume is not alone in his concerns about the controller/processor
dichotomy and its application in the contemporary technological and
economic reality.146 Gürses and van Hoboken have argued that recent
developments in software production have major implications for data
protection, and in particular, understanding to what extent organizations
operating in the software supply chain have data protection obligations.147
Pointing to the shift from shrink-wrap software to software as a service, and
the rise of the mobile internet, cloud computing and agile software
development processes, they argue that software is becoming more modular
(meaning that most applications, websites and other software are built out of
service modules of third party software).148 The essential point is: “In the
current networked world, almost no system in which personal data is
processed stands on its own.”149
Edwards et. al. explain how data processing has changed since the EU
data protection law’s beginning. 150 They note, first, the shift from unitary
control over the means and the purposes of processing towards shared control
in complex data ecosystems; and second, the shift from centralized to
distributed infrastructure and organization.151 They contend that the current
technological reality is complex and diverse, and data processing operations
can easily be intermingled which, in light of recent caselaw, calls into question
the suitability of existing doctrine of controllership.152
The CJEU has expanded the concept of data controller, contending that
a broad interpretation of the concept is necessary to ensure the principle of
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“the effective and complete protection of data subjects.”153 Consequently, the
demarcation between the concepts of controller, processor, and technology
provider is unclear, as well as the respective liabilities of each of those actors,
causing significant legal confusion and uncertainty of adequate legal
protection for the data subject. The issue is exacerbated in areas with complex
technical configurations that involve a variety of stakeholders, like in the Ed
Tech sector where AI is increasingly embedded in all kinds of devices and
services.
To highlight gaps and ambiguities in the current legal framework, this
article has sought to understand the scope of Article 25 from the perspective of
all system designers acting within the chain of supply of an Ed Tech product
or service. It has examined the role of technology providers and concluded
that in many circumstances they may be considered a (joint) data controller or
a processer, particularly if the court or DPA takes a “microscopic view” of
data processing operations that is focused on individual data processing
operations within the system and the value chain. That said, if a technology
provider does not process any personal data nor have any influence over the
“means” of processing for their own economic benefit, then a finding of a
controllership is unlikely. Regardless of whether a technology provider is
found to be a controller or processor, it may have obligations to assist a data
controller to stay up to date on the state of the art under Article 25, although
the scope of this obligation is unclear.
In conclusion, there is a need to recognize the complex, interdependent
and non-linear context of contemporary data processing where there exist
many different controllers, processors and other actors processing personal
data in different geographical locations and at different points in time for both
central and peripheral purposes. Likewise, the complexity of the supply of
software must also be emphasized, particularly in contexts like in the supply
of educational technology where technology providers can play a key role in
the preservation of privacy and data protection rights but may only have a
tangential link to the universities that ultimately use their products and
services.
Finally, the GDPR, directed only at data subjects, controllers, and
processors, is insufficient on its own to regulate AI effectively. There are
many different actors involved in the design, development, procurement, and
use of AI systems like those being deployed in HE settings and new
approaches are needed to ensure that these systems respect the fundamental
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right to privacy and data protection.154 Here, there is no doubt a need for a
more dynamic approach towards considering responsibility regarding DPbD
and DPbDf not least where it concerns technology providers. Instead of
thinking about responsibilities in terms of “purpose” and “means” the law
should shift towards a focus on powers and capacities. Clarification
concerning whether and to what extent technology providers must inform
controllers about changes to the state of the art is also needed.
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